The first set of Emory National Debate Institute arguments have been released.
These arguments include —
Topicality — Substantial. The argument they focus on here is that “substantial isn’t incremental,” which is directed at the Taiwan plan in the packet.
Taiwan arms sales aff/neg The plan calls for incrementally reducing arms sales, using September 2016 solvency evidence, and then uses 2009 evidence to claim that the plan establishes trust. As far as anything I’ve seen on Taiwan, goes, this is decent, but you have to remember that September 2016 is two months before Trump was elected and US-China relations have changed substantially since then. Not only is Trump unlikely to be an individual that China trusts (2009 evidence was written early in Obama’s presidency), but As Patrick Porter wrote the Spring of 2019, the world has substantially changed since 2016 and China has become a much more aggressive power. In fact, Porter argues that China was certainly becoming more aggressive and that it was inevitable that the US would have to confront China. This is consistent with the substantial amount of the 2019 evidence in our China Threat/Fill-In disadvantage, as well as the US-China conflict bibliography. Arguments for an accomodationist strategy seem a bit dated. At the very least, teams that want to read Taiwan cases are going to need to read recent evidence about accommodating China.
Note these three articles —
There is no grand bargain with China (2019). Any burst of goodwill, however, will be short lived. Xi and the ruling Chinese Communist Party are incapable of addressing the United States’ fundamental concerns over China’s industrial policies and state-led economic model. Because of this, any process to settle these issues is bound to fail. Even if tariffs are put on hold, the United States will continue to restructure the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship through investment restrictions, export controls, and sustained law enforcement actions against Chinese industrial and cyber-espionage. At the same time, there are no serious prospects for Washington and Beijing to resolve other important areas of dispute, including the South China Sea, human rights, and the larger contest over the norms, rules, and institutions that govern relations in Asia….Yet, at nearly every turn, Xi rejected Obama’s overtures in areas of significant dispute. Instead of seeking to narrow differences, Xi accelerated China’s efforts to develop an illiberal sphere of influence in ways that increasingly undermined vital U.S. interests. While Washington negotiated in good faith, Beijing dragged its feet for years on a bilateral investment treaty that would have addressed many issues at the root of today’s trade war. At the same time, Xi reasserted state control over China’s economy, failing to deliver much-needed reforms that would have created a more reciprocal economic relationship. And after the Chinese government pledged to cease and desist on cyber commercial espionage in 2015, U.S. intelligence officials determined that China was back to its old ways within a couple of years.
America needs unity on China (2019). While most Americans imagine that conflict with China will resemble a high-tech version of World War II, Beijing is already waging a new, irregular type of warfare. Indeed, there is evidence of a “systems level” competition between the United States and China that constitutes a new type of Cold War. This conflict includes covert, ambiguous weapons such as influence campaigns, propaganda, cyberwar, intellectual property theft, industrial espionage, election meddling, political bribery, and surveillance on American soil….America has no choice but to take up the gauntlet. Washington’s well-meaning forty-year effort to engage the CPC and thereby nudge it toward democracy has more than simply failed. It created extensive avenues that Beijing now uses to influence America’s own government and society.
Advice for the Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition (2019). This article argues that the new multipolar world contains threats from China, Russia, Iran, and Japan. The author argues these threats are not the responsibility of Trump but that they were inevitable in the new world order.
DebateUS! Taiwan resources.
Defense Industrial Base disadvantage. This is the standard, “arms sales key to defense industrial base” argument. There are two impacts — hegemony and climate change (defense industrial innovation critical to solve climate change).
Security Kritik. This version of the argument says that targeting arms control as the solution to conflict just props up and sanitizes conflict.
Free access to these files is available through our Camp files folders on the left.